买家联盟为个别企业提供一个机制，让他们联合一起，改善议价能力及提高在与供货商谈判时所得的价值。诚然，这些安排能通过规模经济提高效率，但有时也会扭曲竞争及损害消费者利益。
本文将讨论买家联盟及买家卡特尔在中间市场的法律待遇，展示香港及国内垄断法在这方面的规定，并说明应否考虑这些行为的影响或因为其反竞争目的而遭谴责。
我们首先分析联合买家力量产生的福利影响。虑两种主要用来评价买家力量的的经济模式 - 独买模式(monopsony)及议价模式。
接着，我们分析在香港及国内的价格垄断的法律框架。在我们的分析中，我们会分辨 \"买家卡特尔\"(纯粹是订定买价)及其他购买安排(可能包括价格垄断)。
我们指出，在买家卡特尔的情况下，当订定价格时，竞争法的分析的焦点是非法地垄断价格及扭曲竞争。根据这个方法来分析，即目的方法或本身违法方法，一般的结论是这些做法是违法。另一方面，买家联盟并非只以扭曲竞争为目的，也会包括一些影响买价的条款，故分析时会考虑它们对市场的影响。
II.联合买家联盟的竞争性
买家力量让个别买家或一群买家影响或主宰与上游供货商的贸易条款。这种力量可能是由于买家享有策略性优势，或是由于在投入市场上取得领导性或集体领导地位。竞争法对于买家力量的待遇是具挑战性的。买家力量有时是有效率的及有利于消费者的，有时则具有反竞争效果并损害竞争及消费者。但是，决定买家力量是否有反竞争效果并不容易。
买家力量主要分为两类﹕独买及议价模式。两类对上游的卖方及下游的消费者产生不同的福利影响。3 我们将分析这些影响及其对买家联盟的评价的价值。
独买模式
独买模式是垄断(monopoly)的镜像，指一个单独的主导买家面对一个竞争性的投入市场。根据这个模式，独买者是一个强势买家，可扣起需求，从而以低于竞争价格购买产品。
独买模式可作为研究买家力量的基本准则。它表示在有限度的假设下，独买的力量及扣起需求的做法会导致福利减少及损害消费者的利益。4 根据这一模式，从供货商取得低价并不代表低成本及消费者能最终得益。独买力量所做成的扭曲会导致更高生产成本，或可能做成浪费支出。5 因此，垄断买家并不能将较低的投入成本转给溑费者，因为边际成本决定产品的价格，而垄断买家的边际成本是高于一般买家的。6 因此，这个分配低效导致福利损失。若产品的市场是具竞争性的，在上游存在的独买并不会影响价格，因为独买本身是价格接受者(price taker)。但是，若独买在下游市场享有市场力量，减少的产量会导致产品售价提高，从而损害消费者的利益。
寡头勾结垄断(collusive monopsony)或买方寡头垄断(oligopsony)7 是指一群中型买家在购买市场上联合在一起。这可导致独买模式类似的福利影响。8
若联合市场买家的形成条件具备后，买家可联合将购买水平降致低于平冲竞争数量，从而取得较低的采购价格。这行为可扭曲市场，导致更高的生产成本，浪费支出，有限产品及价格提高，全部都损害消费者利益。寡头勾结垄断造成与独买类似的福利减少。9
必须指出的是这个模式的根本假设。它假设买家面对一个具竞争力的上游市场，及垄断买家购买多一件产品会增加每件产品的成本。这个模式对于某些市场是有价值的，但这个模式的假设并不适用于大部份市场，因为在大部份市场，一般是双方通过谈判，购买多些货品会降低价格。10 议价模式提供另一个较为微妙的方式来分析买家力量。
议价理论
在议价的情况下，买家与一个特定的决策者进行双边谈判。双方谈判期间会产生一连串反应，最终达成一份特定及唯一的合同，其内容并不一定与市场的其他参与者相同。
议价模式与独买模式存在几点基本不同之处。首先，在议价模式中，买家与特定的决策者进行双边谈判而非匿名交易。11 第二，议价模式假设需求变动的威胁而非扣起需求降低价格。12 第三，在当事人的双边谈判中，额外购买货品会使价格降低。13
谈判的结果取决于几个变量，包括公司的其他外在选择。14 买家的其他外在选择的价值视乎其市场力量及绝对和相对的规模15 ，以及在上游市场的竞争水平。卖家的其他外在选择主要视乎它通过其他途径接触消费者的能力。它也受买家的相对市场力量所影响。其他外在选择的价值越低，需求或供应的变动的威胁也较低。其他影响谈判结果的变量包括公司的内部选择16 ，谈判破裂的风险17 ，成本及灵敏度时间控制，以及是否取得信息。
与独买模式中的假设福利损失相反，议价模式展示出一个较为复杂的现实，即福利影响会因市场环境的改变而受到影响。
议价能力的行使(指并不是独买能力的买家能力)一般能提高效率及福利。通过成功议价而取得降价的能力暗示现行价格是高于边际水平，而生产商享有某种程度的市场力量。换言之，在没有市场力量下(即在一个竞争环境下)，是没有提供折扣的空间，因为卖家并不会提供低于边缘成本18 的折扣。因此，行使议价能力能提供效率。一般认为这会将产品的价格及数量贴近竞争水平。只要公司并不因为下游市场力量而获得优势，通过议价获得的较低的批发价很有可能提高福利，因为上游所节省的可以通过低价的方式转移至消费者。19
但是，有时候，议价能力可能产生负面福利影响。这包括水床效应，螺旋效应，动力效应及质量冲蚀。水床效应来自买家的优越谈判地位，从而增加对其他买家的投入成本。20 因此，增加买家购买的数量及规模对其竞争者会有负面影响。21 螺旋效应可以因为其他竞争者被赶出市场而提高某一买家的市场地位。22 由于较少的买家被赶出市场，密度水平会提升。动力效应是指买家力量对新产品的投资或产品的改善产生负面影响，从而损害消费者的利益。23 质量冲蚀是指投入产品的价格所增加的压力会使卖家为了保持利润而降低质量。24
要注意的重点分别是，在非独买的情况，我们不能假设福利损失的存在。我们必须考虑及平衡行使买家力量的影响。由于谈判力量模式是较为易于适用的模式，这使执行的问题更具挑战性。到底买家力量及谈判过程损害了消费者还是只影响在供应縺的利润分配，并没有一个清楚的答案。
III.法律分析- 买家卡特尔及订定买价
买家卡特尔是指，在与某一卖家订定买价时，买家之间的协议。这使卖家面对一群只愿以较低价格购买产品的买家。这作为使买家联起一阵线对付卖家，限制它与其他买家作交易的机会，从而导致较低的买价，对买家有利。
必须注意的是，这个安排因为是在市场上的非法及秘密的合谋而引起关注。结果是在大部分情况下，分析只集中在非法协议来垄断价格，而非买家合谋力量的影响。换言之，垄断价格则导致反竞争的假设，而不用考虑买家力量的负面影响。
事实上，这个方法在国内及香港的竞争法中都可见到。
根据中国法，《反垄断法》第十三条禁止具有竞争关系的经营者达成的某些 \"垄断协议\"。这包括固定商品价格；限制商品的生产数量；分割销售市场或者原材料采购市场；或联合抵制交易。该法并没有区分协议的目的或影响。这些协议可根据《反垄断法》第十五条得到豁免，提高产品质量、降低成本、增进效率，或为提高中小经营者经营效率或竞争力的，则可获得豁免。
工商行政管理机关的执行条例25 规定，竞争者为基于销售数量或地域来划分采购区域的协议是违法的。其他如法改委颁布的关于垄断协议的执行条例限制价格竞争。26 法改委颁布的《反价格垄断规定》27 特别规定了水平的合谋垄断价格。该规定涉及卖价及买家，条件是当事人是 \"竞争者\"。换言之，它们是在供应链的同一水平。该规定第5条指出，价格垄断协议是指在 \"价格方面排除、限制竞争的协议、决定或者其他协同行为\"。第7条禁止不同形式的反竞争协议。与买家卡特尔有关的是第7条第4款至第6款。它禁止 \"使用约定的价格作为与第三方交易的基础； 约定采用据以计算价格的标准公式； 约定未经参加协议的其他经营者同意不得变更价格\"。
在香港，《竞争条例》第6条禁止协议或经协调做法，其目的或效果是妨碍，限制或扭曲在香港的竞争。该条例指出了禁止的协议或经协调做法的非专属的列表，包括直接或间接订定买价或卖价或贸易条件。根据第9条，企业可在以下情况下获得豁免﹕(1通过)改善生产，分销，技术或经济发展，提高整体经济效益的协议，及(II)并不附加对达到这些目的所不可或缺的限制；及(III)并不会消除相当部分的有关市场的竞争。
谴责投入产品的垄断价格
鉴于对垄断价格的一般严谨的做法，以上列出的法律条文并不出奇。该方法包括售价及买价的价格垄断。例如，在欧洲，欧盟委员会在西班牙烟草案(Raw Tobacco Spain)一案中，谴责烟草加工商的卡特尔，其目的是为了降低对烟草生产商支付的买价。28 同样地，在意大利烟草案(Raw Tobacco Italy)一案中，委员会注意到，在加工行业中，买价是任何企业的竞争行为的基本因素，并可影响同一公司在其他市场的竞争，包括下游市场。29 在BNC与加尔(BNC v Clair)30 一案中，欧洲法院指出，若协议的目的是为了限制，防止或扭曲竞争，必须考虑协议的实际影响。从协议的性质来看，一个为了对产品订定最低买价的协议，目的是为了扭曲该市场的竞争。31 诚然，一般认为，买家在一指定市场订定买价的协议或决定，一定被认为有限制竞争的目的，而不须分析它的竞争影响。32
值得注意的是，强烈谴责投入产品的垄断价格是与买家力量是否存在无关。换言之，合谋投入产品价格垄断，无论该合谋企业是否拥有重要的市场地位，都必须受到谴责。因此，合谋独买或谈判力量并不是作出反竞争协议或作为的结论的必然条件。投入产品的垄断价格本身受到谴责，而不论其对市场的影响。33
只注意反竞争目的，而不论其对下游市场的影响，是将垄断价格视为反竞争，而不论其对消费者的影响。因此，它保护市场的架构及防止竞争扭曲。34 回顾一个基本原则，这些协议应受到竞争条款的豁免，若它们符合国内《反垄断法》第15条或香港《竞争条例》第9条的条件。证明符合这些条件的举证责任是在协议的当事人。
结论是，秘密的购买卡特尔因为其对竞争产生扭曲影响而被谴责为反竞争。这些安排被视为限制竞争，除非符合被豁免的条件。
如下所述，买家卡特尔可区别于与通过买家联盟所作出的公开的联合行动。
法律评价 - 买家联盟
有时候，中小型企业会在与上游卖家的谈判期间联合在一起。它们希望通过这样来改善谈判力量，从而使他们与大型企业处于同等地位。联合购买可提高效率及增加福利。这可能是由于小型企业的联合购买并取得规模经济，从而使他们处于与大型企业同等的地位。35 同样地，由于减少交易成本，延长生产，更优惠的供应条款，联合仓库，质量控制，推广，分销，讯息交流及标准化等，都能提高效率。较低的投入产品的成本使联营的成员受惠，并能让他们增加在生产，创新和发展的投资。再者，买家力量能加强投入产品供货商之间在价格及质量上的竞争，并使上游市场更有效率。
买家联盟的形成 ，即买家通过协议协调彼此的购买策略，可包括影响或订定买价的协议。
与买家卡特尔的待遇相反，这个条款的附属性质及它是买家联盟的附属协议，使我们分析这个条款的影响。
因此，与谴责买家卡特尔相反，分析买家联盟时要考虑联合买家力量的濳在反竞争影响。因此，我们需要考虑以下第二章关于买家力量的各种影响，因竞争管理当区需要根据市场环境，决定该协议是否具有限制竞争的效果。
参考欧洲的例子可证明之。事实上，当一个买家联盟是在公开的环境下运作，并以公开及透明的方法营运，竞争管理当局会评估该协议的影响，而不会假设它具有反竞争目的。
例如，在国家硫酸组织(National Sulphuric Acid Association)一案36 ，欧盟委员会评估一个买家团体的规例，它剥夺成员独立谈判供应条款及回赠的选择权。成员作为团体的一个成员，不得以低于团体愿意支付的买价购买货品。欧盟委员会研究协议的影响，并没有发现存在反竞争目的。同样地，在史登素合作社一案(Co?peratieve Stremsel-en Kleurselfabriek v Commission),37 法院分析了一个团体实行的独有购买责任。这些案例一般反映了，即使具透明度的买家联盟的行为导致投入产品垄断价格，也不能假设它们有限制竞争的目的。在很多情况下，订定买价被视为联合协议的附带功能。在这些情况下，对买家的损害，而非投入产品的价格订定，是干预的门坎。
结论
在本文中，我们对买家力量作出经济分析，以及两个地区关于买价订定的法规。在我们的分析中，我们分辨对买家卡特尔和买家联盟的分析。
我们通过反竞争协议分析这两种行为。但是，分析的结论视乎该协议是否有限制竞争的目的或影响。
我们证明了，秘密的买家卡特尔，而其目的是订定买价的，一般被认为有限制竞争的目的。这个方法会视它们为反竞争，不论它们对市场的影响。相反，我们会考虑公开及具透明度的买家联盟对市场的影响。在分析这些案件时，会考虑由于不公平买价产生的负面影响。
Buyer Cartels and Purchase Price Fixing -
A review of the analysis of joint-buyer-power in China and Hong Kong
Ariel Ezrachi** and Mark Williams****
I. Introduction
Buying alliances provide independent undertakings with a mechanism to join forces and present a collective front, thereby improving their bargaining position and enabling them to extract greater value in negotiations with suppliers. While these arrangements can yield efficiencies through economies of scale, they may, at times, distort competition and harm consumer welfare.
This paper considers the legal treatment of buying alliances and buyer cartels in intermediate markets. It explores the way in which competition law in HK and China approaches these arrangements and aims to clarify whether such arrangements should be considered based on their effect on the market, or condemned due to their anticompetitive object.
We begin our analysis with a review of the welfare effects generated by collusive buyer power. We consider the two main economic models used to assess buyer power - these are the monopsony model and the bargaining model.
Following this we explore the legal framework for the analysis of purchase price fixing in HK and China. In our analysis we distinguish between \'buyer cartels\' the aim of which is purely to fix the purchase price, and between other purchasing arrangements which may include some aspects of price fixing.
We illustrate how in cases of buying cartels which fix the purchase price, the competition analysis centres on the illicit price fixing of the purchase price and the distortion of competition. That approach, often referred to as object approach or per se approach will generally lead to condemnation of these arrangements as illegal. On the other hand, we illustrate how buying alliances, which do not aim to distort competition, but may include provisions which affect the purchase price, will be assessed while taking into account their effect on the market.
II. The Competitive Effects of Joint Buying Alliances
Buyer power enables a single buyer, or a group of buyers, to influence or dictate the terms of trade with upstream suppliers. This power may stem from strategic advantages enjoyed by the purchaser. Alternatively, it may derive from the attainment of a dominant or collective dominant position on the input market. The treatment of buyer power in competition law is challenging. At times buyer power may deliver efficiencies and benefit consumers. In other instances, buyer power may have anticompetitive effects and harm both the competitive process and the consumer. Interestingly, it is not always easy to determine the effects of buyer power in a given case, thus making the enforcement decision a complex one.
There are two main categories of buyer power: monopsony power and bargaining power. Each generates different welfare effects upstream on sellers, and downstream on consumers.38 These effects, and their relevance to the appraisal of buying alliances are assessed below.
The monopsony model
The monopsony model provides a mirror image of monopoly, and serves to analyse the behaviour of a single dominant purchaser which faces a competitive input market. According to the model, the monopsonist is by definition a powerful buyer, and so can artificially withhold demand and as a result procure input at a price below competitive levels.
The pure monopsony model serves as the standard instrument to examine buyer power. It shows that under its restrictive underpinning assumptions, monopsonist power and demand withholding will result in welfare loss and detriment to consumers.3 According to the model, the lower prices extracted from suppliers do not entail lower costs and subsequent benefit to consumers. The distortion which stems from monopsony power is assumed to lead to higher production costs and possible wasteful expenditure.40 As a result, the monopsonist will not pass on the lower input cost, since it is marginal cost that determines its level of output, and its marginal cost will be higher than the marginal cost of a firm with no monopsony power.41 The resulting allocative inefficiencies lead to welfare loss. When the market for the output is competitive, the presence of a monopsony upstream is not likely to affect the price, since the monopsony is a \'price taker\'. However, when the monopsony enjoys market power downstream, the reduced output would lead to an increase in output price, to the detriment of consumers.
Collusive monopsony or oligopsony,42 represent a situation where a group of medium size buyers join forces in a way that enable them to present united front on the purchase market. Such instances can trigger similar welfare outcomes as under monopsony model.43 When the conditions necessary for collusion and attainment of joint market buyer are present, buyers may able to cooperate to decrease purchase levels below the competitive equilibrium quantity, and achieve a lower procurement price. This conduct may trigger similar distortion on the market, leading to higher production costs, wasteful expenditure, limited output and possible higher prices, all to the detriment of consumers. The welfare reducing result of collusive monopsony will be similar to that of a monopsony.44
It is important to highlight the main assumptions at the heart of the model. It assumes that the buyer faces a competitive upstream market and that each additional unit purchased by the monopsonist will increase the unit cost that will apply to all of the procured units. While valuable as a proxy to some markets, the model\'s assumptions preclude its applicability to most markets. This is so as in the majority of markets one expects to see bilateral negotiation between the parties, which lead to a reduction in price for any additional unit of input.45 \'Bargaining theory\' provides an alternative, and more subtle, approach to analysing buyer power.
Bargaining Theory
In a bargaining scenario a buyer faces an identifiable decision maker with whom it engages in bilateral negotiation. Its actions may therefore trigger a range of responses from the other player as the two parties engage in dynamic bargaining. The outcome will lead to specific and unique contract which need not reflect agreements with other players on the market.
A bargaining process differs from the monopsony model described above at several fundamental points. First, in a bargaining situation the buyer faces another identifiable decision maker with whom it engages in bilateral negotiation and does not engage in anonymous deals.46 Second, bargaining model assumes that lower prices are obtained by the threat of shifting demand, rather than the actual withholding of demand.47 Third, the bilateral negotiation between the parties is likely to lead to a reduction in price for any additional unit of input.48
The outcome of the negotiation may depend on several variables which include, among other things, the firms\' outside options.49 The value of the buyer\'s outside option depends primarily on its market power, absolute and relative size,50 and the level of competition on the upstream market. The seller\'s outside option mainly depends on the ability to reach consumers through alternative channels. As such it is influenced by the buyer\'s relative market power. The lower the value of an outside option is, the less credible is a threat of shifting demand or supply. Other main variants which affect the negotiation outcome include the firms\' access to inside option,51 the risk of the negotiations breaking down,52 cost and time sensitivity, and access to information.
By contrast to the assumption of welfare loss in a monopsony model, bargaining scenario represents a more complex reality in which the welfare consequences vary depending on market realities.
The exercise of bargaining power (i.e. buyer power which does not amount to monopsony power) will often enhance efficiency and welfare. The ability to reduce the price for input through successful bargaining often implies that the prevailing price is above marginal levels and the supplier benefits from some market power. In other words, absent market power, i.e. in a competitive environment, there would be no margin for discount as sellers will not discount below marginal costs. Accordingly, the exercise of bargaining power is efficiency enhancing.53 One would expect it to bring the input price and quantity closer to competitive levels. Subject to the firm not benefiting from market power downstream, the lower wholesale price which was attained via bargaining power is likely to be welfare enhancing, as saving upstream will be transferred to consumers in the form of lower prices.54
Yet, at times, bargaining power may give rise to negative welfare effects. These include waterbed effects, spiral effects, dynamic effects and quality erosion. Waterbed Effects stem from a buyer\'s favourable bargaining position which may increase input costs for other buyers.55 Accordingly, the increase in the buyer\'s volumes and size will have a negative impact on its competitors.56 Spiral Effects may enhance the buyer\'s market position as a result of other competing buyers being pushed out of the market.57 As smaller buyers are pushed out of the market, concentration levels will increase. Dynamic Effects concern the negative effects buyer power may have on investment in new products or product improvements, to the detriment of consumer.58 Quality erosion concerns instances in which increase pressure on input price will lead the seller to undermine quality in an attempt to retain profitability.59
The crucial distinction to bear in mind is that in a non-monopsony scenario, welfare loss cannot be assumed. It is necessary to consider and balance the effects of the execution of buyer power. Given that the bargaining power scenario is the more readily applicable model, this can make the question of enforcement challenging. It is not always clear whether buyer power and bargaining process results in harm to consumer or merely affects the distribution of profit along the supply chain.
III. Legal Appraisal - Buyer Cartels and Purchase Price Fixing
Buyer cartels are agreements between buyers to fix the purchase price in their dealing with a given seller. The price fixing confronts the seller with buyers that are willing to purchase its output only at a reduced price. This practice enables the buyers to present a single front in their dealing with the seller and limit its \'outside options\' to trade with other buyers. They subsequently result in lower purchase price, to the benefit of the buyers.
It is important to note that such arrangements raise concern due to the illicit and secrete collusion between companies on the market. These concerns dictate, in the majority of cases, an analysis which is detached from the effects of the collusive buyer power and focuses on the illicit agreement to fix the purchase price. In other words, the price fixing triggers an assumption of anticompetitive, and does not require consideration of the possible harmful effects of buyer power.
Indeed, that approach is manifested in both Chinese and Hong Kong competition regimes.
Under Chinese law, Article 13 AML provides that certain \'monopoly agreements\' between competing business operators are prohibited. These include, among others, agreements that: fix the prices of commodities; agree quantitative restrictions; divide downstream sales markets or upstream procurement markets; or agree joint boycotts. No distinction is made between the object or the effect of the agreement. These types of agreement may be exempted under Article 15 AML. Among other things, exemption may be granted if the parties can prove that the object of the agreement is to improve product quality, reduce production costs, improve efficiency, or increase the efficiency or competitiveness of small or medium sized enterprises.
The SAIC implementation Rules60 identify agreements between competitors to allocate procurement markets between themselves based on quantities or geography as being unlawful. Other delegated legislation, issued by the NRDC deal with monopoly agreements that restrict price competition.61 The NRDC Anti-Price Monopoly Provisions62 specifically deal with collusive horizontal price setting. The Provisions cover both selling and buying prices, with the proviso that the parties must be \'competitors\'; that is to say, they are at the same level in the supply chain. Article 5 of the Provisions defines price monopoly agreements as \'any agreement or decision or other act of co-ordination that eliminates or restricts competition in pricing\'. Article 7 prohibits various types of anti-competitive agreement. Of particular relevance to buyer cartels is Article 7(4)-(6) which prohibits agreements whereby the parties agree upon a price to be used as the basis to deal with a third party; or where they adopt a standard pricing formula for calculating price; or where they accept mutual obligations not to vary prices paid or charged without the consent of the other party to the monopoly agreement.
In Hong Kong, section 6 of the Competition Ordinance would prohibit agreements or concerted practices where the object or effect is to prevent, restrict or distort competition in Hong Kong. The Ordinance provides a non-exclusive list of prohibited agreements and concerted practices which includes those which direct or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or trading conditions. Pursuant to section 9, undertakings can obtain individual exemption for offending agreements on the basis that (i) the agreement enhances overall economic efficiency by contributing to improving production, distribution, technical or economic progress and (ii) does not impose restrictions that are indispensible to the attainment of these objectives and (iii) will not eliminate competition in respect of a substantial part of the relevant market.
Outright condemnation of input price fixing
The legal provisions outlined are unsurprising given the normally stringent approach to price fixing. That approach encompasses instances of both sale and purchase price fixing. In Europe, for example, the European Commission condemned, in its Raw Tobacco Spain decision, a cartel of tobacco processors which aimed, among other things, to reduce the price paid to producers for raw tobacco63 Similarly in Raw Tobacco Italy the Commission noted that \'purchase price is a fundamental aspect of the competitive conduct of any undertaking operating in a processing business and is also, by definition, capable of affecting the behaviour of the same companies in any other market in which they compete, including downstream markets.\'64 In BNIC v Clair65 the European Court noted that \'it is unnecessary to take account of the actual effects of an agreement where its object is to restrict, prevent or distort competition. By its very nature, an agreement fixing a minimum [purchase] price for a product... is intended to distort competition on that market.\'66 Indeed it is generally accepted that \'an agreement or decision on the part of buyers to fix the purchase price on a given market must be understood to have as its object to restrict competition, without the need, at that stage of the analysis, for any investigation of its competitive effects.\'67
It is important to note that the strong condemnation of input price fixing is independent of the presence of buyer power. In other words, collusive input price fixing is condemned regardless of the joint entity occupying a significant market position. Accordingly, the presence of collusive monopsony or bargaining power, is not requisite to trigger the finding of anticompetitive agreement or practice. It is the act of input price fixing which triggers the condemnation, regardless of the effect on the market.68
The focus on anticompetitive object with no regard as to downstream effects treats price fixing as anticompetitive irrespective of its effect on consumers. As such, it sets out to protect the structure of the market and prevent the distortion of competition.69 Recall however that as a matter of principle, such agreements may be exempted from the competition provision if they satisfy the conditions for such exemption as outlined in Article 15 of the Chinese AML or section 9 of the Hong Kong Competition Ordinance. The onus will be on the parties to the agreement to satisfy the conditions of these provisions.
To conclude, secretive purchase cartel is condemned as anticompetitive by object due to its distorting effect on competition. Subject to the possibility of obtaining an individual exemption, these arrangements are presumed to restrict competition.
As will be illustrated below, buyer cartels are distinguishable from open and public amalgamation of orders by a buying alliance.
IV. Legal Appraisal - Buyer alliances
At times, small and medium size companies will join forces in their negotiations with upstream sellers. By doing so they may wish to improve their bargaining position and subsequently position the group on an equal footing with larger traders. Joint purchasing may yield efficiencies and enhance welfare. This may arise primarily from aggregating purchases by small undertakings and achieving economies of scale, which position the group on an equal footing with larger traders.70 Similarly, efficiencies could arise from reduced transaction costs, longer production runs, better supply terms, joint warehousing, quality control, promotion, distribution, information exchange and standardisation. Lower input costs would benefit the members of the alliance, and may allow them to increase investment in production, innovation and growth. In addition, buyer power may intensify competition on price and quality between input providers and encourage efficiencies upstream.
Sometimes the creation of a buying alliance - that is an agreement between buyers to coordinate their purchasing strategies - may include an agreement which would affect or fix the purchase price.
By contrast to the treatment of buyer cartel, the secondary nature of such provision and the fact that it is ancillary to the main permissible agreement of the buying alliance dictates an effect based analysis of that provision.
Subsequently, by contrast to the outright condemnation of buyer cartels, the analysis of buying alliances involves consideration of the possible anticompetitive effects of joint buyer power. As such it brings into light the various effects of buyer power discussed above in section II, as the competition agency will aim to determine, in light of the market reality, whether the agreement has the effect of restricting competition.
A glance at the European approach to such arrangements may illustrate this point. Indeed, when a buying alliance is operating in the public eye, and conducts its business in an open and transparent way, the competition agency will assess the effects of the agreement and will not assume that it has an anticompetitive object.
For example, in National Sulphuric Acid Association,71 the European Commission appraised rules of a buying pool which deprived members of the choice to independently negotiate terms of supply and rebates. Members, to the extent that they were tied to the pool, were also prevented from purchasing input when prices became lower than those paid by the pool. The Commission considered the effects of the arrengemebt and did not assume anticompetitive object. Similarly, in Co?peratieve Stremsel-en Kleurselfabriek v Commission,72 the effects of an exclusive purchasing obligation imposed by a cooperative were considered. These cases generally reflect the view that transparent buying alliances, whose activities result in input price fixing, cannot be assumed to have the object of restricting competition. Often, in such instance the setting of purchase price is viewed as an ancillary function to the collaborative agreement. In such instances consumer harm is used as the threshold for intervention, rather than the mere existence of input price fixing.
In such instances consumer harm is used as the threshold for intervention, rather than the mere existence of input price fixing. One would therefore expect the analysis in such instances to refocus on the presence of buyer power and consider whether the joint effort results in collusive monopsony or whether it should be analysed through the prism of bargaining theory.
V. Conclusion
In this paper we explored the economics of buyer power and the legal approach taken in the two jurisdictions to purchase price fixing. In our analysis we distinguished between the legal treatment of buyer cartels and that of buying alliances.
Both of these activities are analyzed through the prism of anticompetitive agreement. Yet, the analysis differs depending on whether the agreement has the object or effect to restrict competition.
We illustrated how buyer cartels which are secretive and aim to fix the purchase price will generally be assumed to have the object of restricting competition. Such approach will condemn them as anticompetitive, regardless of the effect they have on the market. By contrast, buying alliances which are open and transparent will be assessed based on their effect on the market. The analysis in such cases will encompass consideration of effects and focus on the possible harmful effects generated from the unfair purchase price.
注释：
1牛津大学竞争法及政策中心主任；牛津大学竞争法讲师。
2亚洲竞争法论坛主任；香港理工大学法学教授。
3经合组织(OECD)政策圆桌会议，《独买及买家力量》，2008年，DAF/COMP(2008)38；经合组织着，《买家力量﹕主要买家行使市场力量》，1981年。
4罗杰．D．布莱尔(Roger D Blair)及杰弗里．L．哈里森(Jeffrey L Harrison)着，《独买的法律与经济》，剑桥大学出版社，2010年，第45页；艾伦．曼宁(Alan Manning )着，《真正的薄的理论﹕现代劳动市场的独买》，劳动经济期刊，2003年，10/2期，第105页；艾伦．曼宁(Alan Manning )着，《独买在运作》，普林斯顿大学出版社，2003年。
5让．泰勒尔(Jean Tirole)，《工业机构的理论》，麻省理工学院出版社，1988年，65页，第66-92页。
6产出水平将会低于 \"非独买水平\"。罗杰．D．布莱尔(Roger D Blair)及杰弗里．L．哈里森(Jeffrey L Harrison)着，《独买的法律与经济》，剑桥大学出版社，2010年，第46页；乔纳森．M．雅各布布森(Jonathan M Jacobson)及加里．J．多尔曼(Gary J Doman)着，《联合购买，独买及反托拉斯》，反托拉斯会报，1991年，第36期，第1页。
7买方寡头垄断是另一种形式的扭曲竞争，并且是买方寡头垄断市场在需求方面的镜像。每一个买家都足以影响市场，但不能单独而不顾其他竞争者的反应。买家之间的协调可增加买家的集体利润。关于买方寡头垄断的成功条件，请参考詹姆斯．墨菲．奥多德(James Murphy Dowd)着，《买方寡头垄断力量﹕反托拉斯损害及合谋买家在投入市场的行为》波士顿大学法律期刊，1996年，第76期，1075页；经合组织(OECD)政策圆桌会议，《独买及买家力量》，2008年，DAF/COMP(2008)38，第31页。
8在没有价格歧视的情况下，独买和买方寡头垄断会导致数量扭曲及减低效率。当独买家从对下流享有市场力量而得益，这情况会更加严重。见经合组织(OECD)政策圆桌会议，《独买及买家力量》，2008年，DAF/COMP(2008)38。
9 帕斯卡尔尔．V．A．曼宁(Bhaskar, V.A.Manning)及杜．T.(T. To)着，《在劳动市场的买方寡头垄断及独买竞争》，经济角度期刊，2002年，第16期，第155至174页； 罗杰．G．罗尔(Roger G. Noll)着，《买家力量与经济政策》，反托拉斯法律期刊，2005年，第72期，第589页。
10关于这一点，参考公平贸易办工室(Office for Fair Trading)着，《买家力量的竞争影响》，经济讨论报告，2007年1月。
11艾伦．科丁顿(Alan Coddington)着，《谈判程序的理论》，芝加哥阿尔定出版社，1968年，第4页。
12谈判的整体目标是为了降低投入价格及增加购买的数量。
13参考公平贸易办工室(Office for Fair Trading)着，《买家力量的竞争影响》，经济讨论报告，2007年1月。
14这代表谈判的一方有能力找到其他营商伙伴。关于谈判时的其他外在选择，参考阿比轩尼．穆素(Abhinay Muthoo)着，《谈判理论与实践》，剑侨大学出版社，1999年，第5章。
15买家规模越大，外在选择也越多。见经合组织(OECD)政策圆桌会议，《独买及买家力量》，2008年，DAF/COMP(2008)38，第40页，提及卡茨(Katz)着，《对中间货品市场的第三层次的价格歧视的福利影响》，美国经济评论，1987年，第77期，第154页。
16这与外在选择相反，可导致谈判终止。
17参考阿比轩尼．穆素(Abhinay Muthoo)着，《谈判理论与实践》，剑侨大学出版社，1999年，第4章。
18见经合组织(OECD)政策圆桌会议，《独买及买家力量》，2008年，DAF/COMP(2008)38，第43页。
19关于行使买家力量的影响的详细分析，见经合组织(OECD)政策圆桌会议，《独买及买家力量》，2008年，DAF/COMP(2008)38，第42-53页。
20买家组织与供货商谈判得出的低价，使非成员要支付高价。关于这一点的详细分析，见经合组织(OECD)政策圆桌会议，《独买及买家力量》，2008年，DAF/COMP(2008)38及公平贸易办工室(Office for Fair Trading)着，《买家力量的竞争影响》，经济讨论报告，2007年1月，第17-18页。德国联邦卡特尔局(Bundeskartellamt)，《竞争法中的买家力量-现况及观点》德国向经合组织提交的文件，2008年，http://www.bundeskartellamt.de/wEnglisch/download/pdf/2008_ProfTagung_E.pdf.
21水床效应可能是由于买家力，进入市场的壁垒的增加，或市场份额转移，而导致供应市场的改变(如供货商的减少)。关于这三个理论的分析，参考经合组织(OECD)政策圆桌会议，《独买及买家力量》，2008年，DAF/COMP(2008)38，第50-54页。
22要注意在这案中进行干预是有困难的，因为它涉及放弃对消费者的福利利益，而这是由于投机性恐惧竞争者将来会离开市场，从而引起的由于低价而获利，以及增加集中度。见，见经合组织(OECD)政策圆桌会议，《独买及买家力量》，2008年，DAF/COMP(2008)38，背景资料。
23 当上流的竞争激烈，供货商的边缘利润会缩小。当面对集中的下流市场和买家力量，在上流市场进行投资的动力和能力都会减少。
24关于降低质量出现的仅有例子，见，阿里尔．伊拉芝(Ariel Ezrachi)及科恩．约恩(Koen de Jong)，《买家力量，私人标签及降低质量的福利影响》，欧洲竞争法评论，2012年。
25《工商行政管理机关禁止垄断协议行为的规定》第5条。
26必须指是，中国《反垄断法》实施一个复杂的执法程序，即三个机构享有不同但又重叠的责任。国家发展和改革委员会负责价格垄断，包括单独行为或竞争者之间的合谋。非价格垄断是由国家工商行政管理总局负责。在个别案件中区别是否涉及价格垄断是非常困难。这个问题涉及机构的管辖权。这解释这两个机构都颁布实施条例的原因。一个协调机制是存在的，即国务院反垄断委员会是负责处理机构之间的争议。
27国家发展和改革委员会颁布的《反价格垄断规定》，第39条。
28 案件编号，COMP/C.38.238/B.2
29同上，第280段。
30案件编号123/83，1985年，欧洲法院报告，第391页。
31 同上，第22段。
32 佐审官雅各布布斯(Jacobs)在联合案件的意见，即C-264/01，C-306/01，C-354/01及C-355/01。AOK Bundesverband and others v Ichthyol-Gesellschaft Cordes and others，2004年，欧洲法院报告，1-2493页。
33阿里尔．伊拉芝(Ariel Ezrachi)着，《买家联盟及投入产品垄断价格 - 寻找欧洲的执法标准》，竞争法及经济期刊，2012年。
34案件编号 C-501/06，GlaxoSmithKline Services Unlimited v Commission 。见阿里尔．伊拉芝(Ariel Ezrachi)着，《买家联盟及投入产品垄断价格 - 寻找欧洲的执法标准》，竞争法及经济期刊，2012年，第63段。
35《欧盟竞争政策第一报告》，第40段。
36案件编号80/917/EEC, 欧盟在1980年7月9日的判决。 (IV/27.958 National Sulphuric Acid Association)，欧洲官方期刊，1980年第260页，第31-36段。
37案件编号61/80，Co?peratieve Stremsel- en Kleurselfabriek v Commission，欧洲法院报告，1984年 ，0851，第22段。
*Director, The University of Oxford Centre for Competition Law and Policy; Slaughter and May Lecturer in Competition Law, The University of Oxford.
**Director, Asian Competition Law and Economics Centre; Professor of Law, Hong Kong Polytechnic University..
38 OECD Policy Roundtable, Monopsony and Buyer Power, 2008, DAF/COMP(2008)38; OECD Buying Power: The Exercise of market power by Dominant Buyers, 1981.
39Roger D Blair and Jeffrey L Harrison Monopsony in Law and Economics (Cambridge 2010), page 45; Alan Manning \'The real thin theory: monopsony in modern labour markets\' [2003] 10/2 Labour Economics 105; Also see: Alan Manning Monopsony in Motion (2003) Princeton University Press
40 Jean Tirole The Theory of Industrial Organisation (MIT Press 1988) 65, at 66-92
41 Output levels will reduce below \'non-monopsony levels\'. Roger D Blair and Jeffrey L Harrison Monopsony in Law and Economics (Cambridge 2010) page 46; Jonathan M Jacobson and Gary J Dorman Joint purchasing, monopsony and antitrust, [1991] 36 Antitrust Bull 1
42Oligopsony represents another form of distorted competition and a demand-side mirror image of an oligopolistic market. Each purchaser is powerful enough to influence the market, but cannot act independently to the extent that it can ignore the reaction of other competitors to its actions. Coordination between buyers would maximise collective buyer profit. On the condition for successful coordination between oligopsonists, see: James Murphy Dowd Oligopsony Power: Antitrust Injury and Collusive Buyer Practices in Input Markets [1996] 76 Boston University Law Review 1075; OECD [2008] page 31.
43Absent price discrimination, monopsony and oligopsony will result in quantity distortion and loss of efficiencies. This is aggravated when the monopsonist benefits from market power downstream. See: OECD [2008], n 4 above, Background Note
44Bhaskar, V., A. Manning and T. To (2002) Oligopsony and Monopsonistic Competition in Labor Markets, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 16, 155-174; Roger G Noll Buyer Power and Economic Policy, [2005] 72 Antitrust Law Journal 589
45On this point see OFT 863, The Competitive Effects of Buyer Groups, Economic Discussion Paper, A report prepared for the OFT by RBB Economics
46Alan Coddington Theories of the Bargaining Process (1968 Chicago Aldine Pub co) 4
47 The overall goal of the negotiation is to lower the input price and increase the quantities purchased.
48Office of Fair Trading, The Competitive Effects of Buyer Groups, Economic Discussion Paper, A report prepared for the OFT by RBB Economics (OFT 863, 2007) needs a page number
49This represents the ability of one of the parties to the negotiation to find another trading partner. On the role of outside options in negotiations, see Abhinay Muthoo, Bargaining Theory with Application (Cambridge 1999) ch 5
50The larger the buyer, the greater its outside options. OECD, Monopsony and Buyer Power (2008) 40, referring to: Katz \'The Welfare Effects of Third Degree Price Discrimination in Intermediate Goods Markets\' [1987] 77 American Economic Review 154
51Contrast with outside option which would lead to terminating the negotiations.
52Abhinay Muthoo, Bargaining Theory with Application (Cambridge 1999) ch 4
53OECD 2008 (n8) 43
54For a detailed account on the consequences of the exercise of buyer power see OECD 2008 42-53
55The lower price negotiated by the buyer group and the supplier results in higher price to non-members. For a detailed analysis of these points see: OECD 2008 (n8); OFT 863 (n6) 17-18; also see Bundeskartellamt, Buyer Power in Competition Law - Status and Perspectives, [2008], submission by Germany to the OECD, available at:
http://www.bundeskartellamt.de/wEnglisch/download/pdf/2008_ProfTagung_E.pdf
56Waterbed effects may be the result of changes in the supply market (e.g. reduction in number of suppliers) which were triggered by the buyer power, increase in barriers to entry, or market share shifting. For a detailed review of these three theories see OECD 2008 (n8) 50-54
57Note that intervention in this case is problematic, as it requires foregoing welfare gains to consumers who benefit from lower prices due to a speculative fear of future exit by competitors from the market and increased concentration. See OECD 2008 (n8) Background Note
58 When competition upstream is high, suppliers\' margins will be limited. When faced with concentrated downstream market and buyer power, both incentive and capacity to invest upstream would be limited.
59On the limited instances in which quality erosion may take place - see: Ariel Ezrachi and Koen de Jong \'Buyer Power, Private Labels and the Welfare Consequences of Quality Erosion\' [2012] ECLR
60Rule 5, State Administration of Industry and Commerce \'Rules on the Prohibition of Monopoly Agreement Behavior\', Supra.
61It should be explained that under China\'s complex enforcement regime, three agencies have differing and, to some extent, overlapping enforcement responsibilities. NRDC is charged with dealing with \'price monopoly\' cases whether they involve unilateral conduct or collusion between competitors. Non-price monopoly cases are under the purview of the SAIC. The ability to distinguish in any meaningful way between cases where price is or is not a factor will be exceptionally difficult. This matter is an issue of bureaucratic jurisdiction, not of substance. But it explains why two bodies both issue implementing regulations on these issues. A co-operation mechanism is apparently in place to resolve turf wars and the higher level Anti-monopoly Commission of the State Council is charged with resolving any intractable disputes between the agencies.
62 The Anti-Price Monopoly Provisions promulgated by the National Development and Reform Commission, n39
63Case COMP/C.38.238/B.2, Raw Tobacco Italy
64 Ibid, para 280
65Case 123/83, Bureau national interprofessionnel du cognac v Guy Clair, [1985] ECR 391
66Ibid, para 22
67Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs in Joined Cases C-264/01, C-306/01, C-354/01 and C-355/01 AOK Bundesverband and others v Ichthyol-Gesellschaft Cordes and others, [2004] ECR I-2493
68A Ezrachi, \'Buying Alliances and Input Price Fixing - In Search of a European Enforcement Standard \' [2012] Journal of Competition Law & Economics
69Case C-501/06, GlaxoSmithKline Services Unlimited v Commission, noted in A Ezrachi, \'Buying Alliances and Input Price Fixing - In Search of a European Enforcement Standard \' [2012] Journal of Competition Law & Economics at para 63
70para 40, European Commission First Report on Competition Policy
7180/917/EEC, Commission Decision of 9 July 1980 (IV/27.958 National Sulphuric Acid Association) [1980] OJ L 260 (paras 31-36)
72Case 61/80 Co?peratieve Stremsel- en Kleurselfabriek v Commission [1984] ECR 0851 (para 22)
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